Irregular Warfare Podcast

Episode 154 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines a core puzzle in intrastate conflict: how a small number of foreign fighters can exert outsized influence on insurgencies. Anchored in Professor Tricia Bacon’s The Counterinsurgency Dilemma, this episode explores when foreign fighters strengthen insurgent groups—and when they undermine them. 

While foreign fighters are often associated with higher levels of violence, they typically make up only a small share of insurgent forces. As Bacon argues, this reveals a key insight: local insurgents—not foreign fighters—drive outcomes. They control strategy, resources, and relationships with the population, making them the decisive actors in any insurgency.

Foreign fighters can still provide meaningful advantages. They bring combat experience, specialized skills, and sometimes external funding. Their high risk tolerance and ideological commitment can make groups more aggressive and tactically capable. In fragmented insurgencies, they can even shift the balance of power among rival factions.

However, these benefits come with serious costs. Foreign fighters often lack cultural understanding and local legitimacy, and their preference for extreme violence can alienate civilian populations. Over time, this can strain relationships within insurgent movements, reduce local recruitment, and erode long-term effectiveness.

Drawing on his experience as U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Steven Schwartz highlights how groups like al-Shabaab evolved from foreign-influenced networks into locally driven organizations. Their durability, he notes, stems less from popular support than from their ability to impose predictable order—often outperforming weak governance alternatives.

Ultimately, the episode reframes foreign fighters as a diagnostic tool rather than the central problem. High levels of foreign fighter influence often signal a weak insurgent group, while limited influence suggests a stronger, locally embedded movement. For practitioners, this distinction matters: effective counterinsurgency must focus on the local dynamics that sustain insurgencies—not just the foreign fighters who draw attention.

Description

Episode 153 examines the role of unconventional warfare and special operations forces in conventional major war.

Summary

This conversation explores how unconventional warfare can support, shape, and sometimes substitute for conventional military operations in large-scale combat. Our guests examine what unconventional warfare is, why it matters beyond the special operations community, and how support to resistance forces can create strategic and operational effects for joint force commanders. The discussion draws heavily on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where U.S. Special Forces partnered with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create a northern front, tie down Iraqi forces, generate intelligence, and support the broader conventional campaign. The episode also examines the limits and risks of unconventional warfare, including partner alignment, feasibility assessments, political constraints, and the need for policymakers and commanders to understand both the value and the limitations of this tool. 

Takeaways

Unconventional warfare is best understood in simple terms as support to resistance movements or insurgencies.

Unconventional warfare is not just a SOF issue; conventional joint force commanders and civilian policymakers need to understand how it can support broader campaigns.

UW can supplement conventional forces by shaping the battlefield, imposing costs, generating intelligence, and creating dilemmas for the enemy.

UW can also substitute for conventional forces when geography, politics, or access prevent a conventional formation from operating in a particular area.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a powerful example of UW supporting a conventional campaign, as a small number of U.S. SOF personnel helped mobilize Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create pressure in the north.

Working with local forces is not the same as replacing U.S. infantry with indigenous infantry; resistance forces have their own strengths, limits, interests, and operating areas.

Successful UW depends on feasibility: competent local leadership, survivable terrain, contested space, political conditions, and at least some alignment of objectives.

Interest alignment is rarely perfect, but major divergence between U.S. objectives and partner objectives can create serious strategic risk.

Relationships matter. Long-term credibility, prior engagement, and trust can make UW options more viable when crises emerge.

Policymakers should not assume UW can be created instantly in a crisis; the best options often require years of preparation, relationships, infrastructure, and understanding.

SOF practitioners need to explain UW in terms conventional commanders care about: operational effects, risk, timing, authorities, and contribution to the broader campaign.

Special Forces must remain excellent at working by, with, and through partners—not just at unilateral tactical tasks.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ken Tovo served as the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. A career Special Forces officer, he commanded at multiple levels and has extensive experience in special operations, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare. He is currently the president and CEO of DOL Enterprises, Chairman of the Green Beret Foundation, and a senior partner at National Security Capital Partners.

Mark Grdovic is the author of Those Who Face Death: The Untold Story of Special Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Resistance. He served as a battalion operations officer during the 2003 invasion of Iraq while working alongside Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq. After retiring from the Army, he has continued to support the special operations community, including work with SOCCENT and USSOCOM.

Kyle Atwell and Alexandra Chinchilla are the hosts for episode 153. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: Cover image is a personal photo provided by one of the podcast guests.

Episode 152 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast grapples with the many definitions of irregular warfare used across the community of interest.

In this episode, our guests discuss why the concept of irregular warfare has resisted a stable definition across decades of changing doctrine, and what that persistent confusion has cost operationally and strategically. We walk through three competing definitional approaches— the maximal, the traditional, and the competition-disruption model — weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each. We close by asking what irregular warfare actually is at its core, and why getting that answer right matters, not just for writers of doctrine, but for practitioners.

The article is here: Fragmented Frontiers: Three Approaches to Understanding Irregular Warfare

 

Dr. Chris Tripodi is Reader in Irregular Warfare at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London. His research focuses on the forms of knowledge Western militaries use to understand their operational environments, and the complex relationship between counterinsurgency theory and practice.

 

Eric Robinson is an Associate Director of the Data Science and Technology Group at the RAND Corporation, where his research focuses on special operations, irregular warfare, and gray zone challenges. He is the lead author of RAND's 2023 report Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces, which we touch on in today’s episode.

 

Lieutenant General (ret.) Mike Nagata served for 38 years in the US Army, with 34 years in special operations. Among his many positions of leadership, he served as Commander of US Special Operations Command-Central from 2013 to 2015, and was heavily involved in the first two years of combat operations against the Islamic State.

 

Alisa Laufer hosts this episode. Please reach out to the Irregular Warfare Podcast team with any questions about the episode or the broader mission of the show.

 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

 

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

 

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Episode 151 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores how the United States wields power not only through military force, but through dollars, sanctions, export controls, and supply chains. Anchored in Eddie Fishman’s book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, this episode examines the rise of economic statecraft as a central feature of great power competition.

Drawing on the firsthand experiences of former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and former Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh, the conversation unpacks key concepts such as dollar dominance, sanctions design, and the hidden “chokepoints” embedded within global finance and technology that give the United States asymmetric leverage.

Through case studies on Iran, Russia, and China, the guests assess both the power and the limits of economic warfare. Sanctions can bring adversaries to the negotiating table—but only when aligned with clear political objectives, coalition support, and careful calibration to avoid self-inflicted harm. In the strategic competition with China, export controls on foundational technologies reflect a shift from coercing behavior to preserving relative advantage. The episode ultimately argues that economic tools must be treated with the same rigor as military force: grounded in legitimacy, disciplined in execution, and guided by a coherent doctrine for an era of geo-economic rivalry.

Space is no longer a silent backdrop to conflict—it is a contested domain that enables, shapes, and increasingly defines how wars are fought. In this episode, Ben Jebb and Charlie McGillis sit down with Dr. James Kiras and General Stephen Whiting to examine the strategic importance of space in both great power competition and irregular warfare. The discussion explores how modern military operations rely on space-based capabilities for precision, synchronization, intelligence, and global reach—and what happens when those capabilities are contested.

 

The conversation also dives into the evolving “SOF-space-cyber triad,” highlighting how special operations forces, space professionals, and cyber operators can integrate to create complex dilemmas for adversaries. From maneuver warfare in orbit to countering Chinese influence campaigns in the Global South, the episode underscores a critical takeaway: space superiority is not automatic. It must be defended, integrated, and deliberately incorporated into joint campaigning if the United States and its partners are to preserve their strategic advantage.

Dr. James Kiras is Professor of Strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Air University. A leading scholar on special operations and irregular warfare, his research focuses on strategy, special operations theory, and the integration of emerging domains into modern conflict.

General Stephen N. Whiting is the Commander of United States Space Command, where he leads joint forces responsible for military operations in the space domain. A career Air Force officer with extensive experience in space operations and national security strategy, he oversees efforts to defend U.S. and allied interests in an increasingly contested and competitive space environment.

 

Ben Jebb and Charlie McGillis are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Charlie with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.