Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [24-351] USPS v. Konan

  United States Postal Service v. Konan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: United States Postal Service.Respondent: Lebene Konan. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lebene Konan, a Black property owner, leased two rental residences in Euless, Texas, and retrieved business and tenant mail from a central mailbox daily. In May 2020, United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Jason Rojas changed the lock on the mailbox at one of Konan's properties without her approval, halted mail delivery, and demanded ownership verification. Even after USPS’s Inspector General confirmed Konan’s ownership, Rojas and another USPS employee, Raymond Drake, allegedly continued marking mail addressed to Konan and her tenants as undeliverable. Konan claims this refusal of service extended to her second property and was racially motivated, causing loss of rental income and disruption of essential communications. Konan sued USPS, Rojas, Drake, and the United States, raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and alleging violations of the equal protection guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985. The district court dismissed her FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the postal-matter exception, and her equal protection claims for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claims but reversed on the FTCA claim, holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claims based on intentional acts of mail non-delivery. Question Does a claim that Postal Service employees intentionally refused to deliver mail to a designated address arise out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of postal matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal-matter exception?

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• [24-568] Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections

  Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: Michael J. Bost.Respondent: Illinois State Board of Elections. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Michael Talent (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Jane E. Notz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Bost, a multi-term U.S. Representative from Illinois’s 12th District, along with Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney, political activists who served as presidential electors in 2020, challenged Illinois’s mail-in ballot receipt procedure. Under Illinois law, election officials can receive and count mail-in ballots for up to fourteen days after Election Day if the ballots are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs argued this procedure violates federal election statutes by impermissibly extending Election Day beyond the federally mandated date. They claimed the counting of these “untimely” ballots dilutes their votes and forces them to expend additional campaign resources to monitor ballot counting for two weeks after Election Day. Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2022 against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its Executive Director. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court also rejected their claims on the merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Question Do federal candidates have Article III standing to challenge state laws that allow mail-in ballots to be received and counted for two weeks after Election Day based on claims that such laws dilute their votes and force them to incur additional campaign expenses for extended ballot monitoring?

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• [24-5774] Barrett v. United States

  Barrett v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent, in support of the Petitioner) Charles L. McCloud (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence. Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c). Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?

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• [24-539] Chiles v. Salazar

  Chiles v. Salazar Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.Respondent: Patty Salazar. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shannon W. Stevenson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions. In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review. Question Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

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• [24-440] Berk v. Choy

  Berk v. Choy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: Harold R. Berk.Respondent: Wilson C. Choy. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Frederick R. Yarger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Harold R. Berk injured his ankle and allegedly received negligent medical care from three healthcare providers: Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, Inc., and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Middletown, LLC. Believing he suffered harm due to their malpractice, Berk filed a lawsuit against them under Delaware law. Like many states, Delaware requires plaintiffs in medical negligence cases to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM)—a statement from a qualified expert certifying that the lawsuit has a reasonable basis—either with the complaint or within a short time after filing. Berk failed to submit an AOM with his complaint and did not request an extension before the deadline passed. Because the Delaware statute treats the AOM requirement as mandatory, the district court dismissed his case. Berk appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware AOM statute is substantive and therefore must be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity. Question Must a Delaware law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity?

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